Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the application of the Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America regarding the application of their competition laws. 1 January 1998 to 31 December 1998. COM (99) 439 final, 13 September 1999 by unknown
***  *  *  *  *  *  *  *** 
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Brussels,  13.09.1999 
COM(1999)439 final 
REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCU.. 
AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
ON THE APPLICATION OF THE 
Agreement between 
the European Commumties and 
t/1e Government of  the United States of  America 
regarding the application of  their competition laws 
1 January 1998 to 31  December 1998 1.  INTRODUCTION 
On 23.09.199.1 the Commission concluded an Agreement with the Government of 
the United States of America regarding the application of their competition lawst  ("the 
1991  Agreement"), the aim of  which is to promote cooperation between the competition 
authorities. By the joint decision of  the Council and the Commission of 10.04.19952 the 
Agreement was approved and declared applicable. 
On 8.10.1996 the Commission adopted the first report on the application o( the 
Agreement for the period of 10.04.1995 to 30.06.19963. The second report completes the 
1996 calendar year, covering the period of 1.07.1996 to  31.12.19964•  The third report 
covers the whole calendar year 1997S,  and the present report covers the calendar year 
from the 1.01.1998 to 31.12.1998. This report should Qe read in conjunction with the first 
report  which  sets  out  in detail  the  benefits,  but  also  the  limitations  of this  kind  of 
cooperation. 
2.  ECIUS. COOPERATION :THE RECORD SO FAR 
In the period from  April 1995 till December 1998 application of the  1991  Agreement 
gave rise to contacts on more than 200 competition cases. 
In all cases of  mutual interest it has become the norm to establish contacts at the outset in 
order to exchange views and, when appropriate, to coordinate enforcement activities. The 
two  sides,  where  appropriate,  seek  to  coordinate  their  respective  approaches  on the 
definition of relevant markets, on possible remedies in order to ensure that they do not 
conflict, as well as on points of  foreign law relevant to the interpretation of  an agreement 
or to  the effectiveness of a remedy.  Cooperation under this heading has involved the 
Agreement between  the  Government of the  United  States of America  and the  Commission  of  the 
•  European Communities regarding the application of  their competition laws (OJ L 95, 27.4.95, pp.47 
and 50) 
2  See OJ L 95, 27.4.95, pp.45 and 46. 
3  Com(96) 479 fmal, see XXVItb Report on Competition Policy, pp. 299-311. 
4  Com(97) 346 fmal, see XXVIth Report on Competition Policy, pp. 312-318. 
s  Com(98) 510 fmal, see XXVIIth Report on Competition Policy, pp. 317-327. 
2 synchronisation of investigations and  searches.  This is  designed  to  make fact-finding 
action  more  effective  and  helps  prevent  companies  suspected of cartel  activity  from 
destroying evidence located in the territory of  the agency investigating the same conduct 
after its counterpart on the other side of  the Atlantic has acted. 
Formal activation of the positive comity provision (Article V of the  1991  Agreement) 
was felt appropriate in the Sabre/Amadeus case. The US Department of Justice ("DoJ") 
requested  the Commission to investigate specific allegations of  discrimination advanced 
by the US Computerised Reservation System {CRS) SABRE regarding the operation of 
the  CRS  AMADEUS  set up  by a  number of European  airlines.  The  Commission is 
currently investigating the case in close co-operation with the DoJ. More details will be 
published in the first ECIUS cooperation report following the closure of  this case. 
2.1  Mergers 
Since the adoption of the Merger Regulation, there has been nearly every year a steep 
increase in the number of operations notified to the Commission.  The number of cases 
increased annually by more than 30% in 1997 and 1998. 
On top of the increase in the number of transactions. there are a number of indications 
that the current merger wave has a new, global dimension. Indeed, there is an increase in 
the co-operation between the US and the EC on merger cases. 
International co-operation has proved effective in the context of individual cases.  An 
example of  best cooperation practices is set by the WorldCom/MCI case, where the two 
case-teams  worked  smoothly  together.  Indeed,  joint  negotiations  were  undertaken 
between the parties and the US DoJ and the European Commission, as a result of  which 
the  parties  agreed  to  find  a  buyer  and  to  divest  MCI's  Internet  activities  prior  to 
completing the merger. On the basis of these undertakings, the Commission cleared the 
transaction on 8 July 1998 and, following approval from the US DoJ and the FCC, MCI's 
Internet business was sold to Cable & Wireless. The merger was cleared in September 
1998.  This kind of  co-operation has been replicated in many other transactions. 
In fact, the co-operation is very extensive : co-operation on timing, on market definition, 
{in  th~  Boeing/McDonnell  Douglas  case,  for  example,  both  the  Federal  Trade 
Commission ("FTC") and the Commission reached the same product definition of  "large 
commercial aircraft"), co-operation on remedies and co-operation on the assessment of 
anti-competitive effects. US antitrust authorities have moreover participated as observer 
in  some  Commission  hearings  (Guinness/Grand  Metropolitan,  Boeing/MDD  and 
Worldcom/MCJ),  and  the Commission is  exploring the  possibility  for  its  officials  to 
attend, under similar conditions and with the consent of  the parties, certain key meetings 
between the US competition authorities and parties to  proceedings under US  antitrust 
rules. 
The complexities involved in the handling of  cases involving more than two competition 
agencies need also be taken into consideration. Co-operation between, for instance, four 
or even more  agencies  might be more difficult to  manage than a  single transatlantic 
communication.  The risks of reaching diverging decisions,  or simply of the  agencies 
being unable to grasp the economic significance of all  aspects of a given transaction, 
would  then  be  higher.  In  a  few  instances,  transactions  needed  clearance  by  several 
competition agencies (for example the Price Waterhouse/Coopers &  Lybrand merger). 
3 In such cases, the various agencies involved have co-ordinated their investigations.  None 
of the two potential pitfalls identified above has yet materialised.  It is true that in some 
rare instances (cfthe Boeing case), the final outcomes of  procedures have been different. 
However, final decisions have never been in conflict. 
2.2.  Cartels· 
The US-DoJ has suggested in the past that cooperation in cartel cases would be facilitated 
if  there was in DGIV ~me contact point responsible for major international cartel cases. It 
is expected that the new DGIV cartel structure, the Cartel Unit6, will be in a position to 
provide this interface with officials of the DoJ responsible for  criminal investigations. 
This should facilitate cartel cooperation, even if  it cannot solve all problems. 
Until  now,  despite  excellent  cooperation  with  the  US  in  merger  cases,  DGIV  has 
experienced  difficulties  regarding  cooperation  in  cartel  cases,  primarily  because  of 
confidentiality rules.  DG IV receives no  advance notice of settlements in "guilty plea" 
cases, our leniency policies are not sufficiently co-ordinated and we have difficulties in 
planning joint investigations. 
On the issue of advance information (in the absence of waivers, which are rare in such 
cases),  it  is  clear  that  the  DoJ  is  in  some  instances  not  able  to  provide  advance 
notifications  is  normally  contemplated  in  the  EC-US  Agreement  because  of the 
confidentiality  constraints.  The  situation  could  be  improved,  if an  EC/US  Bilateral 
Agreement, pursuant to the 1998 OECD Recommendation concerning Effective Action 
against Hard Core Cartels', made it possible for the US authorities and the Comn1ission 
to  share confidential information.  It is  clear that  EC  and  US  actions  against  serious 
infringements  (e.g.  hard  core  cartels)  would  be  more  effective  if we  could  share 
confidential information. 
A comparison of the leniency scheme in the EC  and the corporate immunity scheme in 
the  US  also  reveals  divergences  that  could create practical  problems.  Some common 
strategy in order to solve these problems appears desirable. 
2.3.  Abuses of  Dominance 
One of the best examples of co-operation with the US  in a case of abuse of dominant 
position is the 1993 Microsoft case which led, in 1994, to an undertaking from Microsoft 
to modify its licensing practices. This followed a period of  intense negotiations involving 
Microsoft and a team of senior officials drawn from the European Commission and the 
United  States  Department  of Justice.  These  negotiations  also  resulted  in  Microsoft 
settling charges brought by the United States Department of  Justice by signing a consent 
decree. 
The negotiation of the undertaking remains a milestone in the co-operation between the 
EC Commission and the United States Department of Justice: during the investigations 
6 
7 
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4 conducted by DG IV  and by the DoJ respectively, Microsoft consented to the exchange 
of information between the two competition authorities by waiving its right to secrecy 
with respect to  both authorities.  A number of contacts  between DG IV  and  the  DoJ 
followed; a co-ordinated approach was elaborated, and it was agreed to negotiate jointly 
with Microsoft. To this end, trilateral talks were held, both in Brussels and in Washington 
DC. They resulted in an undertaking by Microsoft to both authorities. 
Although  this  type of joint action  was  carried  out  independently of the  Cooperation 
Agreement in competition matters concl~ded in 1991  (its legal validity was at that time 
still  under scrutiny by the Court of Justice),  it  served  as  an  important model  for  the 
future, as it showed how the two authorities can combine  their efforts to deal effectively 
with giant multinational companies. The success of  this joint approach also sent a strong 
signal to all multinational companies, including those in other sectors. 
The 1996 investigation into the practices of  Nielsen, a provider of  retail tracking services, 
is also a good example of  successful cooperation 
3.  THE 1998 EC/US AGREEMENT ON POSITIVE COMITY 
It is clear that the 1991 Agreement has provided a solid and quite satisfactory framework 
for  cooperation.  However, with the increasing integration of transatlantic (and  global) 
markets there was a need to broaden, deepen and intensify EU-US cooperation in the area 
of competition. It was also beyond doubt that certain conflicts can be avoided by using 
the positive comity concept more extensively. 
On the basis of a mandate by the Council, the Commission negotiated with the United 
States an agreement which strengthens the relevant provisions of the  1991  Agreement. 
The product of these negotiations, the 1998 ECIUS Positive Comity Agreements was 
signed in Washington and entered into force on 4.06.1998. 
The  1998 ECIUS Positive Comity Agreement, like the 1991  Agreement, does not alter 
existing law, nor does it require any change in existing law.  However, it does create a 
presumption that when anticompetitive  activitie~ occur in the whole or in a substantial 
part of the territory of one of the parties and affect the interests of the other party, the 
latter "will normally defer or suspend its enforcement actiVities in favour of' the former. 
This is expected to happen particularly when these anticompetitive activities do not have 
a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable impact on consumers in the territory of 
the party deferring or suspending its activities. 
The presumption of deferral will only occur if the party in  the  territory of which the 
restrictive activities are occurring has jurisdiction over these activities and is prepared to 
deal actively and expeditiously with the matter.  When dealing with the case that party 
will keep its counterpart closely informed of any developments in the procedure, withiri 
the limits of  its internal rules protecting confidentiality. 
8  Agreement  between  the  European  Communities  and  the  Government  of the  United  States  of 
America on the application of  positive comity principles in the enforcement of their  competition 
laws, OJ L 173, 18/06/1998, pp. 26-31. 
5 The  new  Agreement  constitut~  an  important  development,  since  it  represents  a 
commitment on the part of the European Union and the United States to cooperate with 
respect to  antitrust enforcement in certain situations, rather than to seek to  apply their 
antitrust laws extraterritorially. 
3.1.  Protection of confidential information 
Following  its  1st  Statement9  in  1995,  the  Commission  indi~ated  in  a  new 
"Statement on Confidentiality oflnfonnation" made during the adoption on 29.05.1998 
of the Joint Council and Commission Decision concluding the  1998  Positive Comity 
Agreement that: 
•  "The Statement made by the Commission in April  1995  on the  confidentiality of 
information and the exchange of  interpretative letters dated May 31  and July 31, 1995 
in relation to the 1991 Agreement apply in their entirety to this Agreement. 
•  Article VII of  this Agreement states that existing laws remain unchanged and that the 
Agreement must be interpreted consistently with those existing laws. This Agreement 
therefore cannot permit either of  the Parties' competition authorities to do any act they 
do not already have the power to do. One consequence of  this is that the Commission 
may  only  provide  irlformation  to  the  US  authorities  where  it  is  consistent  with 
Community law to do so. 
•  While this Agreement envisages that it may be appropriate to provide information to 
the other party in order to keep it informed of enforcement activities, confidential 
information may only be provided with the consent of  the source of  that information. 
Community  law  provides  a  high  level  of protection  to  confidential  information 
provided to the Commission, and it will be necessary that any consent obtained is 
sufficient to discharge the Commission from its obligation of  confidentiality pursuant 
to general principles of Community law, the case-law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities and Article 20(2) of  Council Regulation No 17". 
3.2.  Transparency vis-a-vis Member States concerned 
Member States concerned are kept infonned of cooperation activities under the 
1991  EC/US Agreement in accordance to the  I" Statement by the Commission to the 
Counci110  in  1995.  The Commission indicated in a new "Statement on Transparency" 
made during the adoption on 29.05.1998 of  the Joint Council and Commission Decision 
concluding the 1998 Positive Comity Agreement that: 
•  "The  principles  on  transparency  which  govern  the  relationship  between  the 
Commission and the Member States in the application of the competition rules  as 
enshrined,  in  particular,  in Council  Regulation No  17,  the  statement  made  by the 
9  Submitted by the Conunission to the Council during the adoption on 10.04.1995 of the Joint Council 
and Commission Decision regarding the entry into force of  the 1991 EC/US Agreement and published 
in  the  3rd ECIUS  cooperation report at point 3,  Com(98) 510 fmal;  see also  XXVIIth Report on 
Competition Policy, pp. 317-327.  . . 
10  Submitted by the Commission to the Council during the adoption on 10.04.1995 of the Joint Council 
and Conunission Decision regarding the entry into force of  the 1991 ECIUS Agreement and published 
in  the  3rd EC/US  cooperation report at point 4, Com(98)  510 fmal;  see  also  XXVIIth  Report on 
Competition Policy, pp. 317-327. 
6 Commission in  April  1995  on transparency and the  arrangements  contained  in  the 
exchange of interpretative letters dated 31  May and 31  July 1995, in relation to the 
1991 Agreement shall apply. 
•  The  Member  States  whose  interests  are  affected  shall  be  informed  as  soon  as  is 
reasonably possible of all  requests by the US authorities  to  investigate or remedy 
anticompetitive activities and of  all proceedings opened by the Commission as a result 
of  a request by the US authorities under Article Ill of  this Agreement. 
•  The  Member  States  whose  int~sts are  affected  shall  be  informed  as  soon  as  is 
reasonably  possible  of requests  to  the  US authorities  under  Article  III  of this 
Agreement to investigate anticompetitive activities.  · 
•  The Member  States  whose  interests  are  affected  shall  be  informed  as  soon  as  is 
reasonably possible of Commission and US deferrals or suSpensions of enforcement 
activities pursuant to  Article  IV(2)  of the  Agreement,  or of Commission  and  US 
initiations  or  re-institutions  of such  activities  pursuant  to  Article  IV(4)  of the 
Agreement. 
•  When the Commission opens proceedings following a request by the US  authorities 
under Article III of this Agreement, the undertakings concerned shall be informed of 
the existence of  the request, at the latest when the statement of  objections is issued, or 
when a publication pursuant to Article 19(3) of  Council Regulation No 17 is made. 
•  The annual report presented by the Commission to  the European Parliament and the 
Council on the application of the 1991  Agreement shall also cover the application of 
this Agreement, including any cases where information has been exchanged under the 
Agreements". 
3.3.  Application of the 1998 Agreement 
In the period from  its entry into force  (  4.6.1998) to 31.12.1998 no  requests have been 
submitted by the EC or the US under the 1998 Positive Comity Agreement. 
4.  CASE SPECIFIC COOPERATION WITHIN 1998 
The cases listed below are those which fall directly under the EC/US Agreement and are 
dealt in the US by either the US DoJ or the FTC. Some competition cases are dealt in the 
US  by other agencies,  for  instance  the US  Department of Transportation  (DoT),  the 
Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) or the US Department of  Commerce (DoC). These 
agencies do not formally cooperate with the Commission directly, but do  so  indirectly, 
mostly through the DoJ. There are therefore informal contacts between the Commission 
and these agencies. These cases are not discussed in this report. 
7 4.1  Statistical information 
a)  Number of  cases notified by the Commission and by the US 
There were the total of  fifty-two notifications made by the Commission during the 
period  between  1 January  1998  and  31  December  1998.  The cases  are  divided  into 
merger and non-merger cases and are listed in the Annex 1. 
The  Commission  received  the  total  of forty-six  notifications  from  the  US 
authorities during the ·same period. Twenty-four were received from the DoJ and twenty-
two from the FTC. A list of these cases is found in the Annex l, again broken down in 
merger and non-merger cases. 
Merger cases made up the majority of all notifications in both directions. There 
were  forty-three  merger notifications  by  the  Commission  and  thirty-nine  by  the  US 
authorities. 
The  figures  given  represent  the  number  of cases  in  which  one  (or  more) 
notifications  took  place  and  not  the  total  number  of individual  notifications.  Under 
Article II of the Agreement, notifications are made at certain stages of  the procedure and 
so several notifications may be made concerning the same case 
Table 1 sets out in figures the number of cases notified under the  1991  EC/US 
Agreement during the period from 1 January 1998 to 31 December 1998. Table 2 sets out 
in figures the number of  cases notified since 23 September 1991. 
Table 1 
CASES NOTIFIED 
Year  No.ofEC  No. of  US  No. of  merger 
notifications  notifications  notifications 
FTC  .  DoJ 
1998  52  22  24  43(EC)  39 (US) 
••• 
8 Table 2 
CASES NOTIFIED 
Year  No.ofEC  No.ofUS  No. of merger 
notifications  notlflcatlons  notlflcatlons 
FTC  DoJ 
1991  5  10  2 (=12)  3 (EC)  + 9 (US) 
1992  26  20  20 (=-=40)  11  (EC) + 31 (US) 
1993  44  22  18 (=40)  20 (EC) + 20 (US) 
1994  29  16  19 (=35)  18 (EC) + 20 (US) 
1995  42  14  21  (=35)  31  (EC) + 18 (US) 
1996  48  20  18 (=38)  35 (EC) + 27 (US) 
1997  42  12  24 (=36)  30 (EC) + 20 (US) 
1998  52  22  24 (=46)  43 (EC) +39 (US) 
b)  Notifications by the Commission to Member States 
The text of  the interpretative letter sent by the European Communities to the US 
as well as the Statement on Transparency made by the Commission to the Council on 10 
April 1995 (see point 3.2 above) provides that the Commission, after notice to the US 
Competition authorities, will infonn the Member State or Member States, whose interests 
are affected, of the notifications sent to it by the US antitrust authorities. Thus, when 
notifications are received from the US Authorities, they are forwarded immediately to the 
relevant units ofDG IV and at the same time copies are sent to the Member States, if  any, 
whose interests are affected. Equally, at the same time that DG IV makes·notifications to 
the US authorities, copies are sent to the Member State(s) whose interests are affected. 
In most instances, the US  authorities also  notify  the Member States directly, 
under the OECD Recommendationll.  During the period under review  35  cases were 
notified to the United Kingdom, 17 to Gennany, 11  to the Netherlands, 8 to France, 3 to 
Spain and Sweden, 2 to Italy and 1 to Denmark, Finland and Ireland each. 
4.1  Substantive aspects or  case-specific cooperatfont2 
1998 was notable not only for  the continuation of a  substantial  level of merger and . 
acquisition  activity  but  also  for  the  increasing  size  of the  deals  being  announced. 
11  Revised recommendation of the OECD Council concerning cooperation between Member countries 
on anti-competitive practices affecting international trade, adopted 27/28 July 1995. 
12  This report concentrates on aspects of case  handling related to  the  EC/US  cooperation.  For more 
infonnation on a particular case see the .XXVIIth Report on Competition Policy. 
9 Throughout. the year there were a string of announcements of ever larger global-scale 
mergers. 
At the start of the year the merger with largest claimed value was the WorldCom/MCI 
deal, with a figure  in the order of US$37 billion.  During the course of year this was 
surpassed  by  mergers  with  higher  announced  values,  for  example,  the  Travelers 
Group/Citicorp  deal,  the  BP/Amoco  and  Exxon/Mobil  mergers,  as  well  as 
SBC/Ameritech,  Daimler Benz/Chrysler,  and  American  Home Products/Monsanto. 
Other headline cases announced in 1998 included Price Waterhouse/Coopers & Lybrand 
and KPMG/Ernst &  Young,  as well as numbers of smaller concentrations which had 
implications beyond their home territory. 
Not all large mergers require filing in Europe - SBC/Ameritech is one example which did 
not fall under EC jurisdiction.  But as most of  those mentioned above were international, 
if not global in scale, the majority required multiple competition filings with different 
agencies, including normally the EC and the US anti-trust enforcement agencies. 
It might  be  thought  that  large  mergers  would  normally  require  more extensive  co-
operation simply because of their scale, but this is not necessarily true.  While some 
relatively large cases fell  technically within the EC jurisdiction, they had little or no 
competitive  impact  in Europe.  This -might  be because the main  focus  of activity  is 
outside Europe, such as in the Travelers Cltlcorp case, or because the merging parties 
were  coming  together  from  home  positions  in  their  respective  territories  and  the 
competitive  impact of the  overlap was  minimal.  In the Daimler Benz/Chrysler and 
BP/Amoco cases each party was active principally in its respective home continent, but 
absent or not substantially present in the territory of the  other,  hence  overlaps were 
marginal or non-existent. 
In such cases co-operation will be limited, and typica1ly involve case handlers in the EC 
and US respectively making contact with one another, keeping each other informed about 
their  respective  timetables,  and  perhaps  discussing  product  and  geographic  market 
definitions. 
In  another category of case,  the EC  and US  agencies may adopt  differing  views on 
produ-ct and geographic markets, but find co-operation helpful in establishing why those 
differences  exist,  and  to  satisfy themselves that they  are  comfortable with their own 
reasoning.  American Home Products/Monsanto, and Hoffmtmn-La Roche/Boehringer 
Mannheim, were cases where the conditions of competition were different in Europe 
from  those  in  the  US.  Even if the  product  or geographic  markets  and  hence  the 
competition analysis  differ,  there may still be cases where a certain co-ordination of 
treatment of remedies is desirable.  Hoffmann-La Roche/Boehringer Mannheim  and 
Halllburton/Dresser  were  examples  where  discussions  took  place  about  possible 
remedies. 
More substantial co-operation in the assessment phase may arise where the geographic 
extent of the product or service markets is either world-wide, or covers both the United 
States and Europe.  In these cases both agencies have an interest in ensuring consistency 
of  product and service market definition, and in knowing whether the other believes there 
is  a  substantial  competition  issue.  In  Price  Waterhouse/Coopers  &  Lybrand, 
WorldCom.IMCI,  Wolters  .Kluwer/Reed  Elsevier,  Exxon/Shell  and  Marsh  & 
10 McLennan/Sedgwick,  discussions  took  place  about  product  market  definition  and 
geographic extent, with a view toconfirming each agency's analytical approach. 
It is becoming more common for case handlers to ask for waivers on a routine basis in 
order to enable the agencies to exchange confidential information between one another. 
Frequently  the  main benefit  of this  is  not  so  much the  information  which  might  be 
exchanged, but the removal of constraints which prevented-the agencies from  having a 
free  and unfettered dialogue.  For example, such exchanges prevent misunderstandings 
which might  otherwise  arise  owing to  an  imperfect understanding  of the  position  or 
intentions of case handlers in the other jurisdiction.  And where co-operation is carried 
into  the  investigation  stage,  a  co-ordinated  approach  can  reduce  the  burden  on  the 
notifying parties and third parties.  Finally, co-operation in the devising of remedies can 
help the notifying parties avoid 'double-jeopardy' whereby they are required to negotiate 
remedies sequentially, and thus have to make further concessions to the second agency to 
secure the clearance of  a deal which has already received the blessing of  the first. 
If  such dialogue is to be of value, it is important to facilitate it as early as possible in the 
assessment process.  A common feature of  earlier attempts to secure waivers was lengthy 
negotiations with the parties about the terms of  their waiver, to the point where the value 
of any subsequent co-operation might be lost.  The Commission has begun to  take the 
initiative  in suggesting to  notifying parties a  'standard form'  waiver,  which  they  are 
invited to sign, and hence to minimise the time spent on negotiating the terms. 
In a few  cases, co-operation has been taken a stage further,  to include co-ordination of 
investigative  activity.  Although  both  agencies  would  continue  to  make  their  own 
enquiries of third parties,  they might discuss who should be contacted, and co-ordinate 
the questions to be asked.  In WorldCom/MCI, assessments were greatly facilitated by 
the readiness of many firms  who responded to parallel enquiries from  the EC  and US 
agencies and allow information to be shared between them, or who supplied the same 
submission to both. 
Co-operation  can  go  further  still.  In WorltlCom/MCI and  Exxon/Shell case  the  co-
operation which had begun during the assessment stage was continued when discussions 
of remedies began.  In WorltlCom/MCI trilateral remedy negotiations were conducted 
between the notifying parties and the two agencies.  In addition, the US Department of 
Justice ("DoJ" ·the US  agency responsible for handling the case) and the Commission 
jointly conducted the market testing of  a first set of  remedies.  This included the presence 
of  one person from DG IV case team in the DoJ premises to take part to the DoJ market 
testing.  In Exxon/Shell, the remedy was extensively discussed between the US and EC 
agencies before either agency came to a final view. 
There are as yet few  cases on record where co-operation has taken place regarding the 
implementation of undertakings offered, but this may be an area of  growth in the futUre. 
In WorltlCom/MCI there was  an exchange of letters between the EC and the  US  DoJ 
where  the  Commission  requested  the  DoJ's co-operation  regarding  the  undertakings 
which were mutually offered by the parties to both the Commission and the DoJ.  The 
DoJ  confirmed  that  it  would  take  whatever  steps  are  necessary  and  appropriate  to 
evaluate, and if it found  them to be sufficient, to  seek the effective implementation of 
these undertakings.  In a good example of such co-operation, the Hlllliburton/Dresser 
case was cleared within the first Phase in the EC, but in the US it took somehow longer 
because of several serious problems identified there.  One of the problem areas  found 
11 related to the market for drilling fluids.  Although this was of concern to the European 
Commission as well as to the DoJ, the US Antitrust Division was considered to be better 
placed to deal with it, as it involved divestitures of assets located in the US. Therefore, 
the  Commission kept  in close  contact  with  its  US  counterparts,  and  relied  on their 
pursuing the required divestiture as an element in deciding to clear the case at Phase 1. 
Subsequently, the US Antitrust Division kept the Commission fully infonned throughout 
the divestitme process.  · 
S.  CONCLUSIONS 
The implementation of  the bilateral EC/US 1991 Agreement has been very successful so 
far.  Approaches  by the  respective  antitrust  authorities  have  been  largely  converging 
rather than diverging. The experience has  shown that co-operation with the US  is not 
merely an option but rather an absolute necessity if  both competition authorities want to 
be able to deal effectively with the ever-increasing problem of  cross-bo~er restrictive 
business activities. 
This  co-operation  is  even  more  necessary  because of the  importance  of the  sectors 
principally concerned (transport, telecom, phannaceutical~ computers,  ... ), and because of 
the implications of  competition decisions for these key industries. 
It is clear that these Agreements do not eliminate the possibility of conflicting views, 
because the different authorities retain the right to make their o~analysis  and to reach 
decisions ·independently of each other.  However; increased cooperation contributes to 
improving the effectiveness and efficiency of both the EC's and the US's competition 
laws and reduces the risks of  divergent decisions. 
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NOTIFICATIONS BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION TO THE US 
AUTHORITIES  01.01.1998 -31.12.1998 
Merger casestJ: 
01  Case D
0  IV  /M.J 094 - CaterpDlar/Perklns Enaines 
02  Cue  D0  IV/M.1042- Eutmu Kodak/Sun Chemical 
03  Case D
0  IV/M.986- Aafa-Gevaert/DuPont 
04  Cue n° IV/M.1081 • Dow Jones/NBC- CNBC Europe 
05  Case D
0  IV/M.970- TKSIITW Slpodell'ltan 
06  Case D
0  IV/1069- WorldCom/MCI 
07  Case n° IV/M.1040- Wolten-Kiuwer/Reed-Eisevler 
08  Case n° IV/M.lllO- Compaq/Diptal 
09  Case D
0  IV/M.1112- Advent Internadonai/EMIIWH Smith 
10  Case n° IV  /M.11 09 - Owens-llllnols/BTR Packapng 
11  Case D
0  IV/M.1020- GE CapltaVSea Containen 
12  Case D
0  IV/M.llSS- Cendant Corpora~on/NPC 
13  Case n° IV/M.l139- DUIFM Holdings 
14  Case D
0  IV/M.ll62 -GEIBAYER 
15  Case D
0  IV/M.1168 -Deutsche Post/Lufthansa/DHL 
16  Case n° IV/M.ll92 -CBS Electronlcs/Metrologie International· 
17  Case D
0  IV/M.ll96 -Johnson Controls/Becker 
18  Case n° IV/M.1182 -Akzo NobeVCourtaulds 
19  Case n° IV/M.l140 -HalllburtoDIDresser 
20  Case n° IV/M.1137 -E:uoDIShell 
21  Case n° IV/M.1208 -Jeffenon Smurflt/Stone Container 
22  Case D
0  IV/JV.S- CeaeteVCuai+/Amerlca Online/Bertelsmann 
23  Case n° IV/M.1204 -Daimler Benz/Chrysler 
24  Case D
0  IV/M.1229 -American Home Products/Monsanto 
25  Case D
0  IV  /M.1289 -Harbert Manaaement/DB/Banken Trust/SPP/Ohman 
26  Case n° IV/M.1276-NECIPBN 
27  Case n° IV/M.1306 -Berkshire Hathaway/General Re 
28  Case D
0  IV/M.1292 -Condnentai/ITI 
29  Case D
0  IV/M.1300-AIIled SlgnaVAMP 
30  Case n° IV/M.1304 -Hercules/BetzDearbom 
31  Case n° IV/M.1307 -Manb & McLennan/~edplck 
32  Case D
0  IV/M.1246 -LH7JCarl Zeiss 
33  Case n° IV/M.1293 -BP/Amoco 
34  Case D
0  IV/M.1286 -Johnson & Johnson/Depuy 
35  Case D
0  IV/M.1298 -Kodakllmation 
36  Case n° IV/M.1301 -Texaco/Chevron 
37  Case n° IV/M.1327 -Canal+, CDPQ and Bank Amerlca/NC 
38  Case n° IV/M.1252 -AT&TffCI 
39- Case n° IV/JV.15- BT/AT&T 
40  Case n° IV/M.1335 -Dana/Glacier Vandervell 
l3  Due to the confidentiality requirements, this list names only those investigations or cases which have 
been made public. 
13 41  Case n° IVIM.1368 -Ford/ZF 
42  Case n° IV/JV.12- Motorola/Ericsson/Nokia/Psion 
43  Case n° IV  /M.1355-NewelVRabbermaid 
Non-merger casest4: 
01  Case n° IV  /36.638 - FIAJFOA 
02  Case n° IV/36696- Parallel Products of  DuPont Paints and Plgmeats 
03  Case n° IV/36890- Monitoring of  Digital's Undertaking of8 October 1997 
04  Case &
0  IV/36702- Investigation  of Iomega  Corporation  agreements  and 
market behaviour 
OS  Case n° IV/34237- Anheuser Bash/Scottish and Newcastle 
06  Case n° IV/37241 - Boeln&fAirbas 
07  Case n° IV/36967- Belolt/Valmet 
08  Case D
0  IV  /36545 - Aminoaclds 
09  Case n° IV/37174- Network Solutions Premier Partner Program 
14  Due to the confidentiality requirements, this list names only those investigations or cases which have 
been made public. 
14 ANNEX2 
NOTIFICATIONS BY US AUTHORITIES TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
01.01.1998-31.12.1998 
Meraer cuest  s 
01  see footnote 
02  DuPoutiDegussa 
OJ  T &N PLC/Federal-Mogul 
04  Engille Alliance 
05  Flir/Speetra 
06  GNKIArmstroua 
07  Seutrachem/Dow 
08  Reed Elsevier/Wolten Kluwer 
09  Siemeus/FPG 
10  Wolten Kluwerfl'bomson 
11  Nutoue/Nortek 
12  SC Investments/Andes 
13  Sun1ard/Rolfe & Nolan 
14  Wolten Kluwer/Waverly 
15  ANRFS/ANRPfl'ransok/Sbell 
16  Haneo/Paudrol Jackson 
17  Colouiale/Parmalat!Kinuett 
18  Boelus-McDonnell Douglas helicopter business 
19  PMSVCoguizaut 
20  Intel Corporation/Digital Equipment Corporation 
21  Worldcom/MCI 
22  Reed Elsevier/Matthew Bender 
23  Crosfleld ICI/Grace 
24  see footnote 
25  CbryslerCorporatlon/Dalmler-Benz 
26  Aleatei/DSC 
27  American Home Products/Monsanto 
28  Peanon/VIaeom 
29  Wandel & Goltermann/Wavetek 
30  Metallaesellschaft/Cyprus Foote· 
31  Giant Food/Ahold. 
32  Jeffenon Smurflt/Stoue Container 
33  Halllburtou/Dresser 
34  see footnote 
35  BP/Amoco 
36  see footnote 
37  Elsaa BaUey/Fiumeceaulea/ABB 
38 ·  Sulzer/Guldaut 
39  AT&TIBT 
IS  Due to the confidentiality requirements, this list names only those investigations or cases which have 
been made public. 
15 40  see footnote 
41  Exxon/Shell 
42  Manb &McLennan/Sedgwlck 
Non-merger casesl6 
01  ICI Explosives 
02  see footnote 
OJ  see footnote 
04  see footnote 
OS  see footnote 
06  see footnote 
07  see footnote 
16  Due to the confidentiality requirements, this list names only those investigations or cases which have 
been made public. 
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